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INTRODUCTION 
The Revealed-Preferences Ranking methodology developed by 
Professors Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. and Brian L. Frye purports to be an 
“objective ranking” because it identifies the claimed preferences of first-year 
law students by looking at and comparing the “quality” of the first-year 
students who chose to attend each law school based on the LSAT and UGPA 
indicators for the entering class at each law school.1 For The 2019 Revealed-
Preferences Ranking of Law Schools, the authors incorporate the preferences 
 
 *  Professor of Law and Co-Director of the Holloran Center for Ethical Leadership in 
the Professions at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis, Minnesota. I 
am very grateful to Bernie Burk and Emma Rasiel, with whom I have discussed some aspects 
of these issues over many months. I also am grateful to C.J. Ryan and Brian Frye for engaging 
in a productive dialogue regarding some of my concerns with the Revealed-Preferences 
Ranking, particularly in relation to the challenges associated with incorporating transfer in 
data. 
 1. See Christopher J. Ryan, Jr. & Brian L. Frye, The 2019 Revealed-Preferences 
Ranking of Law Schools, 7 BELMONT L. REV. 86, 87 (2019). 
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of those who chose to transfer out from a given law school as a further 
indication of how the preferences of transfer students inform the “quality” of 
a given law school.2 
While I appreciate the concept of trying to generate something that 
can be identified as an objective ranking, I write to highlight two issues that 
shroud the accuracy of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking as a general 
matter: the failure to account for (1) the size of the entering class and (2) the 
average net tuition paid by an entering class, both of which may skew the 
results of the Revealed-Preference Ranking somewhat significantly. I also 
comment briefly on the inclusion of “transfers out” as a further indicator of 
preference, while applauding the authors for deciding to exclude “transfers 
in” from their analysis given a number of issues with the use of the “transfer 
in” data. 
I.   SIZE 
Perhaps the most significant issue with the Revealed-Preferences 
Ranking is its complete failure to account for the size of the class that is 
enrolled at a given law school. 
Assume that there were two law schools ranked equally in the 2018 
Revealed-Preferences Ranking because they had exactly identical first-year 
class profiles in Fall 2017, such that under the methodology described in the 
Revealed-Preferences Ranking they came out with the same “score” or 
“index.” To provide more context for this hypothetical, assume that both law 
schools had the following LSAT and UGPA profiles: 165/162/158 and 
3.75/3.6/3.4. If one school had 400 first-year students and the other school 
had only 200 first-year students, should they actually be considered to be 
equal in quality, or by the logic of the Revealed-Preferences Methodology, 
shouldn’t the law school with the larger enrollment be viewed as stronger 
because it in fact attracted more of the “best” students? 
This “size” dilemma gets more complicated over time. What if, in 
the 2019 Revealed-Preferences Ranking, these two law schools again had the 
exact same LSAT and UGPA first-year class profiles in Fall 2018—
165/162/158 and 3.75/3.6/3.4—but the school with 400 first-year students in 
Fall 2017 still had 400 first-year students while the school with 200 first-year 
students in Fall 2017 now had only 180 first-year students? The 2019 
Revealed-Preferences Ranking would still treat these two schools as being 
identical even though one clearly did better in attracting the best students 
than the other on a year-over-year basis. 
Thus, my first critique is that, because the Revealed-Preferences 
Ranking fails to account for the size of a given law school’s entering class in 
any way, it creates potential anomalies in the rankings. 
 
 2. Id. at 87–88. 
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I recognize size can be a confounding factor. Some law schools 
simply have different size operations. Harvard has had roughly 560 first-year 
students for the last several years while Yale has had roughly 200 first-year 
students for the last several years. Yale is designed to operate on a different 
“scale” in terms of campus infrastructure and human resource capacity 
(faculty and staff). Thus, the fact that Harvard attracts 560 of the strongest 
students while Yale attracts roughly 200 of the strongest students should not 
necessarily mean that Harvard is profoundly “better” than Yale simply 
because a larger number of strong students chose to attend Harvard. But at 
the same time, hypothetically, if, in a declining market, Harvard continues to 
attract 560 of the strongest students while Yale attracts only 180 of the 
strongest students in terms of LSAT and UGPA profile, then one could posit 
that Harvard is “stronger” than Yale because a slightly larger percentage of 
strong students year-over-year continued to choose Harvard over Yale.  
Phrased differently, while I think that one of the foundational 
premises of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking is accurate—that all law 
schools are competing for the “best” students—they aren’t all competing for 
the same number of the best students or for a growing market share of the 
best students. Indeed, most law schools were operating at something of a 
“steady-state” prior to the Great Recession, taking in roughly the same 
number of first-year students year over year with only modest changes in 
LSAT and UGPA profile year-over-year. The challenge between 2010 and 
2015 was that the applicant pool shrank by roughly 38 percent (from roughly 
88,000 to roughly 55,000) forcing law schools to make difficult choices.3 
Most highly-ranked law schools, with a choice of giving up revenue (smaller 
classes and/or lower average net tuition (discussed infra)) or profile, gave up 
revenue to maintain profile.4 The relative attractiveness of a law school to 
first-year students then would be better-measured by changes in relative 
performance over time. This would take into account relative profile (how a 
given law school’s profile compares with the profiles of other law schools 
along with how its profile changed in comparison with changes in the profiles 
of other law schools) as well as relative size (how much did one law school’s 
first-year class size change in comparison with the first-year class sizes of 
 
 3. Archive: 2000-2015 ABA End-of-Year Summaries—Applicants, Admitted 
Applicants & Applications, LSAC, https://www.lsac.org/archive-2000-2015-aba-end-year-
summaries-applicants-admitted-applicants-applications (last visited Aug. 11, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/2Z48-63M6]. More significantly, the nature of the applicant pool also 
changed, with a smaller percentage of applicants at the top end of the LSAT distribution and 
a greater percentage of applicants from further down the LSAT distribution. Jerry Organ, 
Changes in Composition of the LSAT Profiles of Matriculants and Law Schools Between 2010 




 4. Bernard A. Burk et al., Competitive Coping Strategies in the American Legal 
Academy: An Empirical Study, 19 NEV. L.J. 583, 621 (2019). 
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other law schools). The strongest law schools in such a ranking would be 
those that had the strongest profiles and managed to increase profile and/or 
size or minimize declines in profile and/or size.  
II.   AVERAGE NET TUITION 
The other significant issue with the Revealed-Preferences Ranking 
is its complete failure to account for average net tuition in any meaningful 
way.  
Assume that there were two law schools ranked equally in the 2018 
Revealed-Preferences Ranking because they had exactly identical first-year 
class LSAT and UGPA profiles in the Fall of 2017 such that under the 
methodology described in the Revealed-Preferences Ranking they came out 
with the same “score.” To provide more context for this hypothetical, assume 
again that both law schools had the same LSAT and UGPA profiles noted 
above: 165/162/158 and 3.75/3.6/3.4. Assume for this analysis that each law 
school also enrolled 200 students in its first-year class. These two law schools 
would seem to be identical and would appear to be appropriately ranked 
equally in the 2018 Revealed-Preferences Ranking, given that the size of the 
first-year class and the LSAT and UGPA profile of the first-year class are 
identical. 
But what if one law school attracted its 200 students with an average 
net tuition after scholarships of $35,000, while the other law school attracted 
its 200 students with an average net tuition of $25,000? Would you still 
consider these two law schools to be equal, or would the logic of the 
Revealed-Preferences Ranking suggest that the law school able to charge 
$35,000 for the “best” students is actually more-preferred than the law school 
that can only charge $25,000 to attract a comparable set of students? 
This also becomes more complicated over time. Assume that in Fall 
2017 (the base year for the 2018 Revealed-Preferences Ranking), both law 
schools had 200 first-year students and the exact same LSAT and UGPA 
profiles AND the exact same average net tuition (let’s assume both had an 
average net tuition of $35,000 for the Fall 2017 entering class). Now assume 
that in Fall 2018 (the base year for the 2019 Revealed-Preferences Ranking), 
both law schools again had 200 first-year students and the exact same LSAT 
and UGPA profiles, but that one law school was able to increase average net 
tuition to $37,000 while the other saw average net tuition decline to $33,000. 
The logic of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking methodology would suggest 
these two law schools should still be ranked equally, but clearly one is 
“stronger”—or better able to attract the “best” students—since the best 
students are willing to pay more to go to one than the other. 
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III.   SIZE AND AVERAGE NET TUITION AS APPROPRIATE MEANS OF 
MANAGING PROFILE 
The failure to address size and average net tuition is a flaw in not just 
the Revealed-Preferences Ranking, but in all of the other rankings that rely 
on LSAT and UGPA profile as a component of the ranking—the U.S. News 
Rankings, the Brophy Rankings, the Above the Law Rankings, etc.5 
Going back for more than a decade, critics of the U.S. News rankings 
have noted that a number of components of the rankings are subject to 
manipulation, one of them being LSAT and UGPA profile.6 Prior to the 
agreement between the ABA and the LSAC to have the LSAC “verify” the 
LSAT and UGPA profiles of entering classes across law schools,7 some law 
schools would try to improve the profile of the entering class in a variety of 
ways. At one time, some law schools tried to shift students into part-time 
programs so as to exclude them from the calculation of the LSAT and UGPA 
profile which they reported based only on full-time students.8 At one time, 
some law schools “rounded up” on UGPA.9 While these were perhaps 
somewhat inappropriate ways to improve profile, there always have been two 
entirely appropriate ways to try to improve or maintain profile—work with a 
smaller class (so a school needs fewer strong students to generate the desired 
LSAT and UGPA profile), and work on “buying” more strong students by 
offering greater scholarships (and thereby reducing average net tuition). 
Law schools have the ability to manipulate size and average net 
tuition to craft profile and they have been doing so for some time. In the 
article Competitive Coping Strategies in the American Legal Academy: An 
Empirical Study,10 my co-authors and I demonstrated that among private law 
schools, in the face of a declining applicant pool between 2010 and 2016, 
most law schools accepted fewer students and/or decreased average net 
tuition in an effort to maintain LSAT and UGPA profile (or minimize the 
decline in LSAT and UGPA profile).11 For the vast majority of private law 
schools that had some ability to control their own destiny, profile 
preservation was a greater concern than revenue preservation, and profile 
 
 5. See Ryan & Frye, supra note 1, at 90–93 (discussing a variety of other ranking 
systems). 
 6. For some criticisms of the U.S. News ranking, see id. at 91 n.12. 
 7. Paul Caron, LSAC to Verify Law School Admissions Data Reported to ABA, U.S. 
NEWS, TAXPROF BLOG (June 12, 2012), https://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2012/06/
lsac-to-.html [https://perma.cc/RJP5-EQLE]. 
 8. Alex Wellen, The $8.78 Million Maneuver, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2005), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/31/us/education/the-878-million-maneuver.html 
[https://perma.cc/6R66-YR2V] (describing use of part-time students to exclude students with 
lower LSATs or UGPAs from reported profile).  
 9. Calculations for Class of 2010 on file with author. 
 10. See Burk et al., supra note 3. 
 11. Id. at 627–29. 
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preservation required many schools to reduce the size of their entering classes 
AND to reduce their average net tuition.12 
IV.   SIZE IS WORKABLE—AVERAGE NET TUITION IS PROBLEMATIC 
If one really wanted to construct an “objective” Revealed-
Preferences Ranking that more accurately described the extent to which one 
law school was better able to attract “better” students than another law 
school, the ranking would need to account for size in some way and would 
need to account for average net tuition in some way. 
The size information is readily available for all law schools13 and one 
could look at relative changes in size over time along with changes in profile 
in an effort to determine whether one school has a stronger ability to attract 
the “best” students than another law school. This would be something of a 
“market share” analysis where relative change in market share is the focus 
more so than actual market share at a given point in time.  
This analysis, however, also would be incomplete without some 
engagement of data relating to average net tuition. The problem is that there 
are multiple challenges with integrating average net tuition meaningfully into 
such a ranking. The first challenge with respect to average net tuition is that 
it is essentially impossible to calculate based on publicly-available 
information for public law schools. Roughly 45 percent of law schools are 
public law schools for which there generally are different tuition rates 
charged to residents and non-residents. While the different tuition rates are 
publicly available, what is not publicly available is the percentage of first-
year students who are residents compared to the percentage who are non-
residents. Although some schools voluntarily release this information, it is 
not widely available across the universe of public law schools. Thus, one is 
very hard-pressed to come up with a workable formula for calculating 
average net tuition at public law schools (which would mean they would 
likely have to be excluded from the rankings).  
Moreover, what information is available about average net tuition is 
only available on a one-year deferred basis and is not reported on the entering 
class, but on the entire student body.14 Thus, an effort to integrate average net 
tuition into a Revealed-Preferences Ranking would require that the ranking 
for a given entering class be delayed until December of the following year 
when the ABA releases the grants and scholarship information for the year 
in which that class entered law school. Thus, for the 2019 Revealed-
Preferences Ranking drawing on the LSAT and UGPA profiles of the class 
 
 12. Id. 
 13. The ABA Standard 509 Report includes information on the size of the entering class. 
See ABA Required Disclosures, ABA: SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
http://abarequireddisclosures.org/Disclosure509.aspx (follow “509 Required Disclosures” 
hyperlink, then search Standard 509 Reports by school and year) (last visited Aug. 11, 2019). 
 14. Id. 
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that entered law school in Fall of 2018, the rankings could not be released 
until early 2020 (after the grants and scholarship information for the 2018–
2019 academic year is made available in December 2019). In addition, 
because the average net tuition calculations would be reported based on the 
entire student body (rather than the entering class alone), it would be difficult 
to determine with specificity how average net tuition changed for the entering 
class of first-year students from one year to the next.  
V.   INTEGRATING TRANSFERS 
The effort to incorporate transfers in the 2019 Revealed-Preferences 
Ranking probably is a reasonable refinement, given that the authors 
recognized the need to limit the analysis to transfers out from a given law 
school.  
Let me begin by acknowledging that the desire to incorporate 
transfers into a ranking system designed to reflect law student preferences is 
somewhat understandable given that transfers are expressing a preference. 
Those students leaving one law school to go to another law school are 
expressing a preference—they prefer the law school to which they are 
transferring over the law school from which they are transferring. Thus, I 
think it is reasonable to recognize that those law schools with fewer transfers 
out are seen as preferable relative to those law schools with more transfers 
out. Phrased differently, to the extent that the Revealed-Preferences Ranking 
speaks to the preferences of students based on the quality of students 
choosing to attend a given law school, the fact that a number of students 
choose to transfer away from that law school suggests that the entering class 
quality might slightly overstate the extent to which that law school is in fact 
preferred. 
The authors of the Revealed-Preferences Ranking wisely have 
decided not to include “transfers in” in the calculations of their rankings. This 
decision makes sense for a number of reasons. First, the foundational premise 
of the analysis of preferences of first-years is that all law schools are 
competing for the “best” first-year students. The challenge with trying to 
incorporate “transfers in” as a meaningful indication of student preference is 
that not all law schools are competing for transfer students. One of the biggest 
problems with incorporating “transfers in” into a ranking analysis that 
encompasses all law schools is that most law schools really are not 
participating in the transfer market in any meaningful way. In the summer of 
2018, there were 1,494 transfer students, but 1,020 of them went to 46 law 
schools with ten or more transfers in. Less than one-quarter of law schools 
accepted more than two-thirds of all transfers. By contrast, there were 24 law 
schools with no transfers in, 30 law schools with one transfer in and 25 law 
schools with two transfers in. These 79 law schools (nearly 40 percent of law 
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schools), took in a total of 80 transfers, less than six percent of all transfers.15 
Thus, law schools cannot be said to compete for transfers in the same manner 
that they compete for first-year students. 
But perhaps an even bigger problem with including transfers is that 
it would reward a small subset of law schools with a “multiplier” effect. One 
of the strategies for preserving profile over the last several years that some 
law schools have pursued involved a concerted effort to accept a smaller 
entering class (to preserve profile) while seeking to recoup lost revenue by 
growing the number of transfers.16 The key consideration here is that the 
LSAT and UGPA profile of transfer students are not incorporated into the 
“profile” scoring done by U.S. News (or by the Revealed-Preferences 
Ranking). Thus, because “size” has not been a factor in any of the rankings 
systems, some law schools “gamed the system” by taking a smaller entering 
class and maintaining (or minimizing declines in) profile, and then 
welcoming a large number of transfer students (to the extent possible) to 
recoup some or much of the lost revenue from their smaller first-year class 
(with no impact on their ranking given that the LSAT and UGPA of transfers 
are not accounted for in any of the rankings systems). To the extent that these 
law schools preserved profile by reducing their entering class size, they 
would be rewarded for their profile because size is not a factor in analyzing 
profile. To the extent that they “attracted” more transfers than other law 
schools, they would be rewarded again.  
Moreover, there is no way based on existing available data to account 
for the “quality” of the transfers in a meaningful way. Only law schools with 
more than 12 transfers in are required to report the law schools from which 
transfers were received and the 75th, 50th, and 25th first-year GPA profile 
for the transfers.17 Thus, there is an incomplete data set for trying to assess 
the “quality” of “transfers in.” Nonetheless, when one looks at the available 
data—which focuses on law schools from whom transfers were received and 
on first-year GPA at those law schools, it is pretty clear that the quality of 
“transfers in” diminishes significantly once one moves down the rankings 
chart from Harvard, to NYU, to Georgetown, and beyond.18 It is not a stretch 
to assert that at many of these law schools, the transfer students represent 
students who would not have been admitted in the first instance because they 
would have diluted or diminished the seeming quality of the student body 
based on entering class profile. 
 
 15. Id. 
 16. Jerry Organ, Better Understanding the Transfer Market, LEGAL WHITEBOARD (Dec. 
10, 2014), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legalwhiteboard/2014/12/better-understanding-
the-transfer-market.html [https://perma.cc/A779-J97E]. 
 17. See ABA Required Disclosures, supra note 11. 
 18. Jerry Organ, 2018 ABA Data Show Continued Decline in Number and Percentage 
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CONCLUSION 
The failure to account for the ability of law schools to manipulate 
size and average net tuition to produce a law school first-year class with a 
given LSAT and UGPA profile present significant “gaps” in terms of the 
claim that the Revealed-Preferences Ranking accurately and objectively 
measures the law school “preferences” of first-year law students who made 
choices about where to attend law school. I would suggest that the authors of 
the Revealed-Preferences Ranking at least acknowledge the significant 
“margin of error” that is embedded in the Revealed-Preferences Ranking 
given that it fails to account for size and average net tuition. 
